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scenario analysis shows that under all possible population-water scenarios combinations 
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however, desalination or water imports are required. 
 
Keywords: water resources, scenario analysis, Israel, Palestine, West Bank, Gaza, 
Jordan. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are located between the Jordan River and the 
Mediterranean Sea, while the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is located immediately to 
the east of the Jordan River. The West Bank and Gaza Strip (hereafter collectively 
referred to as Palestine), and Israel are extremely densely settled by global standards, 
having a higher population density than most European countries, and in the case of 
Palestine, average population density significantly exceeds that of all European Union 
states except Malta (Central Intelligence Agency 2003). Because approximately half the 
land area of Israel and Palestine is arid and thus sparsely inhabited, effective population 
densities in non-arid areas are much higher than the average figures suggest. In Jordan 
the population is heavily concentrated in the Amman area while the east and south of the 
country are arid and sparsely settled.   
 
Israel, Palestine and Jordan suffer from severe water scarcity, having very low water 
resources availability compared to the global average (Food and Agriculture Organization 
2004), with this water scarcity directly impacting upon daily life and economic activity 
for much of the population of Palestine and Jordan. Continuing rapid population growth 
in the region raises the question of whether the basic water needs of the population can be 
met for the foreseeable future. 
 
This paper reviews what are basic water needs – the minimum water requirement of a 
country in order to permit social and economic development. This minimum water 
requirement is then compared with feasible population scenarios of Israel, Palestine and 
Jordan for the year 2050 and feasibly water resources scenarios in order to ascertain 
whether the water resources should be sufficient to meet basic these social and economic 
needs.  
 
 
 
 
Minimum water requirements for social and economic development 
 
A range of estimates of per capita water requirements have been developed, ranging from 
20 litre per capita per day (l/c/d) through to 4,654 l/c/d (1,700 m3/c/y). The WHO and 
UNICEF, for example, in their global assessment of water supply adopted the figure of 
20 l/c/d for domestic hygiene purposes as the basic minimum acceptable amount of water 
required per person (World Health Organisation and United Nations Children's Fund 
2000). This figure is not so much a recommendation of the minimum amount of water a 
person requires but, rather, an observation of the amount of water a person is actually 
likely to use when the water source is located remote from their dwelling (but within a 
distance of less than a kilometre) and thus must be carried there. Howard and Batram 
(2003) argue that 20 l/c/d will provide only basic access and will not permit all water 
requirements for hygiene to be met. They argue that 50 l/c/d will allow most 
requirements to be met but that 100 l/c/d, which they term optimum access, will allow all 
domestic requirements to be met.  
 Estimates higher than 100 l/c/d consider economic uses of water. Shuval (1992) suggests 
that 274 l/c/d (100 m3/c/y) is required by a country to meet non-agricultural water needs, 
with a further 68 l/c/d (25 m3/c/y) needed for essential fresh food production. Falkenmark 
(1986) argues that at least 1,369 l/c/d (500 m3/c/y) is required by a modern society living 
in semi-arid conditions, with 80 percent of this water being required for irrigation. Both 
Shuval and Falkenmark’s estimates appear to be based upon Israel’s water consumption 
patterns at the time that each estimate was made. Falkenmark provides higher estimates 
of the thresholds for water scarcity (2,738 l/c/d or 1,000 m3/c/y) and water stress (4,564 
l/c/d or 1,700 m3/c/y), with this higher estimate being adopted by the World Water 
Assessment Programme (2003) as what it describes as the minimum amount of drinking 
water required for an active and healthy human life. 
 
Chenoweth (2008) argues that none of the above estimates of water requirements are 
appropriate for assessing the amount of water required by a country to permit social and 
economic development. The lower estimates only consider domestic water requirements 
and thus don’t consider the water required by a country to run its economy and meet the 
economic needs of its people, while the higher estimates assume that food self-
sufficiency is required, with this being achieved through irrigated agriculture in semi-arid 
conditions. As Allan (2001) demonstrates, countries can adapt to reduced water 
availability by meeting food needs through increased food imports which he terms 
“virtual water”, with many Middle Eastern countries depending extensively on virtual 
water. Countries trade their way to food self-sufficiency in the same way that cities have 
always met their food requirements primarily through trade rather than local production. 
FAO (2006) data shows that even the least developed countries of the world now 
participate to varying degrees in the global food markets, thus clearly breaking the water 
resource – food security nexus. While having sufficient water for food production is 
critical at the global level, within individual countries, it is water for domestic needs and 
for maintaining a non-agricultural economy that is vital as most human activities require 
the use of some amount of water (Chenoweth 2008).  
 
Chenoweth (2008) suggests that there are two possible methods for calculating how much 
water a country requires for meeting domestic needs and the needs of a non-agricultural 
economy, so that it provide its people with a high quality of life. One approach is to 
examine water efficient countries to see if there is a minimum threshold of water 
consumption exhibited by countries that have achieved a high level of social and 
economic development. A second approach is to examine the water intensity of different 
economic sectors to estimate hypothetically the minimum water requirements overall for 
running a water efficient developed economy. Using these two approaches Chenoweth 
(2008) estimates that 120 l/c/d are required for domestic water needs and for sustaining a 
water efficient economy that is capable of providing a high quality of life, with 35 l/c/d 
being required for economic activities and 85 l/c/d being required for domestic uses.  
Allowing for distribution system loses of approximately ten percent increases this 
minimum to 135 l/c/d, or approximately 50 m3/c/y (Chenoweth 2008). This estimate does 
not directly allow for any water for agricultural or landscape uses, such as small-scale 
fresh food production, gardens, parks or street vegetation. One estimate of such water 
needs, by Shuval (1992), suggested that 68 l/c/d (25 m3/c/y) was required for such uses. 
This volume of water, however, is able to be met from recycled wastewater since it is less 
than the amount of water required to satisfy non-agricultural water needs. Indeed, Israel 
already recycles the majority of its wastewater for agricultural uses, with such recycling 
reducing the need to scale back irrigated agriculture. The figure of 135 l/c/d that will be 
used to evaluate viability of the population and water resource scenarios developed for 
2050 for Israel, Palestine and Jordan.  
 
 
The water resources of Israel, Palestine and Jordan  
 
The water resources of Israel, Palestine and Jordan are a mixture of surface water and 
groundwater sources. The Jordan River is the major surface water resource, with Israel, 
Palestine and Jordan all being riparians and thus being linked hydrologically. Water 
quality in the upper Jordan is good, with salinity in Lake Tiberius, the major natural 
reservoir of the Jordan River system, being around 250 mg/l (Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2008). The lower Jordan downstream of Lake Tiberius is poor quality due to the 
diversion of saline springs naturally flowing into Lake Tiberius into the downstream river 
together with irrigation effluent; its waters at present are of little human use. The 
Yarmouk and Zarqa rivers are the major tributaries of the Jordan River, with the 
Yarmouk forming part of the border between Jordan and Israel, and Jordan and Syria. 
The Zarqa River flows into the Jordan River from Jordanian territory.   
 
Major groundwater sources include the Mountain and Coastal aquifers in Israel and 
Palestine, the Western Galilee Aquifer in Israel, and a number of groundwater basins in 
Jordan that are of variable water quality (U.S. Geological Survey 1998). The Mountain 
Aquifer is a limestone-karst aquifer which can be divided into three sub-basins. The 
Western Mountain aquifer and North-Eastern Mountain aquifer are located in the West 
Bank and Israel and thus are shared water resources, while the Eastern Mountain aquifer 
is located entirely within the West Bank. The Mountain Aquifer is the highest quality 
water source of the region, with salinity averaging 137 mg/l (Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2008). 
 
The Coastal Aquifer underlies the coastal plain of Israel and the Gaza Strip. It has limited 
lateral flow westward towards the Mediterranean.  The average salinity of the Israeli 
portion of the Coastal Aquifer is 198 mg/l (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2008), and 
is increasing at a rate of 2.4 mg/l per year (Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection 
2005). In the Gaza Strip the Coastal Aquifer is suffering much more serious deterioration 
in water quality due to the exploitation rate of the aquifer being more than double the 
natural rate of replenishment, leading to significant saline intrusion of sea water from the 
west and naturally saline groundwater flowing from Israel in the east into the 
hydrological depression created by over-pumping (Weinthal et al. 2005). As a result, 
salinity in much of the Gaza Strip exceeds 600 mg/l and in several parts it exceeds 1000 
mg/l, with less than 10 percent of total water exploited meeting the World Health 
Organisation’s drinking water standard of less than 250 mg/l (Weinthal et al. 2005). 
Without significant changes to the exploitation of the Coastal Aquifer in the Gaza Strip, it 
will soon completely cease to be a useful or appropriate source of drinking water. 
However, the relative ease with which it is possible to dig a well and extract water from 
the Coastal Aquifer of the Gaza Strip together with the weak institutional structures in 
place to manage the resource (Trottier 1999), mean that it is unlikely that there will be a 
significant change to the rate exploitation in the near future.  
 
According to Israeli sources, the renewable naturally available water resources of Israel 
and Palestine are 1853 million cubic metres (mcm) per year (Israeli Ministry of 
Environmental Protection 2005). Palestinian sources suggest a somewhat higher total 
resource base of 2,634 mcm (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International 
Affairs 2007). Given that available water resources in the region are essentially fully 
exploited, water usage figures go some way to resolving the discrepancy. Between 2004 
and 2006, water production (excluding treated wastewater) averaged 1723 mcm per year 
in Israel (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2008). In 2007, water production in Palestine 
totalled approximately 113 mcm, excluding water produced from the heavily degraded 
Coastal Aquifer in Gaza (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2008). Thus, it would 
appear that slightly more than 1800 mcm per year of renewable water resources are 
available in Israel and Palestine at present. The renewable water resources of Jordan, 
excluding the water Israel provides to Jordan under the terms of their peace treaty, are 
estimated to be 880 mcm (Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation and Cooperation 
2004). Tables 2 and 3 outline the major sources of water in Israel, Palestine and Jordan. 
Figure 1 shows the groundwater of the region and the Jordan River system. 
 
  
Development of water allocations scenarios for Israel, Palestine and Jordan for 2050 
 
Some of the water resources of Israel, Palestine and Jordan, such as the Eastern Mountain 
Aquifer and the Western Galilee Aquifer, lie wholly within the territory of a single nation 
and therefore are not subject to international water resources law. Under international 
law, countries are expected to co-operate for the equitable use of their shared water 
resources, both surface waters and ground waters (International Law Commission 1999). 
Under international law, Palestine has riparian rights to a portion of the Jordan River’s 
water resources just as Israel and Jordan already exploit the waters of its river basin 
(along with Syria and Lebanon upstream in its tributaries).  
 
The Western Mountain Aquifer and the North-Eastern Mountain Aquifer are also shared 
water resources whose management is complicated by geography – the majority of the 
recharge areas of these aquifers lie in the West Bank but the majority of the natural 
discharge areas of these aquifers lie within Israeli territory, hence Israel was able to 
exploit these aquifers even before its occupation of the West Bank allowed it control 
extraction of the whole aquifer (Trottier 1999). The Coastal Aquifer is also a shared 
aquifer with both Israel and Palestine exploiting this aquifer, however, the amount of 
freshwater that would naturally flow from the Israeli to Palestinian portions of the aquifer 
is uncertain given the limited lateral movement within the Coastal Aquifer. Indeed, as 
Weinthal et al (2005) suggest somewhat controversially, based on isotopic data of the 
sources of salinity in the Gazan Coastal Aquifer, that the Israeli pumping of 6 to 10 mcm 
of semi-saline groundwater annually from the Israeli portion of the Coastal Aquifer near 
the Gaza Strip may be helping to prevent the flow of naturally saline groundwater from 
Israel into the Gaza Strip and thus slowing aquifer deterioration. It is difficult to argue 
under international law that Palestine should gain a larger share of the Coastal Aquifer 
than it would gain under the natural conditions of no pumping from the aquifer in Israel. 
 
While the Mountain Aquifer is a renewable resource of approximately 713 mcm, 
Palestinian exploitation is only around 113 mcm, with Israel taking most of the rest. 
Palestine gains no benefit from the Jordan River’s waters despite having riparian rights to 
a portion of the flow of this river. Thus, of the shared water resources of Israel and 
Palestine, namely the Mountain Aquifer and the Israeli controlled portion of the Jordan 
River system (but excluding the Coastal Aquifer due to the limited lateral flow) which 
total approximately 1370 mcm, Palestine currently accesses less than ten percent directly. 
Palestine currently purchases approximately 49 mcm from the Israeli water system 
(Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2008) but even this amount boosts the 
Palestinian portion of shared water resources to less than 12 percent.  
 
Unfortunately international law does not specify exactly how to determine an equitable 
allocation of a shared water resource, only declaring that all relevant factors and 
circumstances must be considered, including hydrological factors, socio-economic needs, 
extent of dependence of the population of each state on the water resource, existing and 
potential uses of the water, and the availability of alternative sources (International Law 
Commission 1999). Table 3 outlines the approximate current division of both shared and 
internal water resources of Israel, Palestine and Jordan. The total renewable water 
resources for each nation given in this table will be used in the scenario analysis as water 
resource scenario 1, namely the status quo for water resources.  
 
While the per capita water resources of Israel, Palestine and Jordan as three separate 
nations could not be expected to be equal given their different hydrological 
characteristics, it is difficult to argue that the division of the shared water resources 
between Israel and Palestine at present is equitable given that Israel currently takes the 
lion’s share of the Mountain Aquifer, an aquifer which predominantly underlies the West 
Bank and is the only water source currently available there, while at the same time Israel 
also uses a significant portion of the Jordan River’s flow as well as internal Israeli water 
sources such as the Coastal Aquifer, all of which are not accessible as present to the 
Palestinians. However, equity is seldom clear cut and what is judged to be equitable is 
inherently a political judgment influenced by the history of the situation as well as 
perceptions about what the future may bring. Thus, sharing of water resources will need 
to form part of any political discussions leading towards a settlement of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  
 
One hypothetical division of the shared water resources of Israel and Palestine could be 
to split Israel’s current share of the Jordan River basin’s waters and the Mountain 
Aquifer’s water equally. Assuming that there were no further water transfers or sales 
from Israel to Palestine and water share of the Jordan River with Jordan and the other 
riparian nations of the Jordan River basin did not change, this would leave Israel with a 
total of 1117 mcm and the West Bank with 686 mcm per year. Such a split would reduce 
Israel’s water resources to 430 l/c/d while giving Palestine as a whole 481 l/c/d and the 
West Bank 780 l/c/d.  Given likely population growth, the land locked nature of the West 
Bank and thus its inability to desalinate sea water directlyi, as well as the relative 
importance of agriculture to the Palestinian economy, such a division of water resources 
could be argued to be equitable. This water resources division will be used in the scenario 
analysis as water resources scenario 2 – reallocated water resources – as it provides some 
indication of how water resources might be allocated if a comprehensive peace agreement 
or water sharing agreement is reached between Israel and Palestine. 
 
When considering water resources from a long-term perspective it is useful to consider 
the likely effects of climate change. There is a huge uncertainty with climate models in 
terms of their ability to translate a predicted atmospheric concentration of greenhouse 
gases to specific measurable hydrological effect in a given region, and of course the 
extent that greenhouse gases will increase is itself also uncertain. Alpert et al (2006) 
suggest that modest precipitation decreases are likely in the eastern Mediterranean region 
of Israel, Palestine and Jordan, and depending upon the extent of climate change, this 
decrease will range between zero and 30 percent. Hertig and Jacobeit (2008), however, 
suggest that precipitation will decrease in the eastern Mediterranean region by the latter 
                                                          
i Desalinated water could be supplied to the West Bank from a desalination plant located on the 
Mediterranean coast, either in the Gaza Strip or Israel, however, either option would give Israel some 
control over the water as the supply pipes would cross its territory thus from the Palestinian perspective and 
the long history of conflict between Israel and Palestine, this is unlikely to be a politically desirable option. 
Furthermore, with significant energy required to desalinate the sea water and then to pump it up hill to the 
West Bank, desalinated water would be relatively expensive compared to the water naturally available in 
the Mountain Aquifer occurring under the West Bank.  
part of twenty-first century by as much as 50 percent compared to the now. On top of any 
precipitation changes, higher temperatures are likely to result in at least a slight reduction 
in runoff and infiltration, and thus decreased availability of both surface and 
groundwater. For the scenario analysis it would be reasonable to consider a water 
scenario where resources are significantly reduced due to climate change, even if the 
magnitude of this reduction is very uncertain. Water resources scenario 3 will therefore 
assume that the reallocated water resources of scenario 2 will be reduced by one-third by 
2050. Table 4 outlines the three water resource scenarios. 
 
 
Population scenarios for Israel, Palestine and Jordan for 2050 
 
Within its internationally recognised borders, Israel has an area of 20,770 sq km (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2008). Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip) has an area of 6,220, 
while Jordan has an area of 92,300 sq km. The current population of Israel is 7.1 million, 
while Palestine has a population of 3.9 million, split with 1.5 million in the Gaza Strip 
and 2.4 million in the West Bank. Jordan has a population of 6.2 million (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2008). Population growth throughout the region is high, ranging 
from 1.7 percent in Israel, 2.3 percent in Jordan, and 2.7 percent in Palestine. Due to this 
population growth alone, the total population of the region will increase significantly in 
the coming decades. 
 
According to the medium variant population estimates of the United Nations Population 
Division, in 2050 the population of Israel will be 10.5 million, while in Palestine it will 
be 10.3 million and Jordan 10.1 million (United Nations Population Division 2006). 
Thus, according to the best estimate of the United Nations, the population of the region 
will total approximately 30.9 million, assuming immigration and emigration patterns are 
in line with previous trends and a decline in fertility rates occurs similarly to that 
experienced elsewhere in the world. Under the high variant population estimate of the 
UN, the total population of the region reaches 35.9 million, while under the low variant 
estimate, it reaches 26.4 million.  
 
These population projections may be significantly effected by population movements, 
particularly the movement of Palestinian refugees. In 2008 it was estimated that there 
were 4.6 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations living in Jordan, 
Syria, Lebanon and Palestine (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East 2004). If those Palestinian refugees not registered with the UN 
are also considered, estimates of the displaced Palestinian population range as high as 
seven million people (BADILL 2008). Of the 4.6 million registered with the UN, 1.8 
million currently live in Palestine and thus are included in the population estimates and 
projections for Palestine. Another 1.9 million currently live in Jordan, where they have 
citizenship and are mostly well integrated into Jordanian society. These people are thus 
also included in the population estimates and projections for Jordan. The nearly 900,000 
Palestinian refugees currently living in Syria and Lebanon, however, currently lack 
citizenship and for many people living conditions are extremely difficult. It is therefore 
possible that a very significant proportion of these people would choose to relocate to 
Palestine or Israel if given the opportunity to do so as a result of a peace settlement 
between Israel and its neighbours.  
 
Immigration to Israel from Jewish communities elsewhere has played a major role in 
increasing Israel’s population since 1948 as Israel has maintained a policy of unrestricted 
Jewish immigration. Between 1948 and 2007 approximately three million people 
immigrated to Israel, one million of whom immigrated between 1990 and 2000, the most 
recent major wave of immigration (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2008). Since 2000 
immigration to Israel has significantly slowed, with just 18,131 people immigrating to 
Israel in 2007. It is probable that significant immigration to Israel will continue in the 
future although accurately quantifying this immigration is impossible. However, 
allowance for immigration based on past trends is already incorporated in the United 
Nations Population Division estimates for 2050, thus Israeli immigration is already 
incorporated into the United Nations projections.  
 
One further factor that will determine the populations of the region will of course be the 
nature of any political settlements which may occur between Israel and its neighbours. 
While a peace treaty has been signed between Israel and Jordan, and between Israel and 
Egypt, agreements are lacking with Israel’s other neighbours, and critically of course, 
with the Palestinians. A number of political outcomes are possible as a result of such an 
agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. One option would be that the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip together become the sovereign state of Palestine, with borders 
approximately matching the pre-1967 armistice lines separating Israel from these two 
territories. This outcome appears to be where, more or less, the Oslo Peace Process of the 
1990s was leading prior to the collapse of the process in 2000. It has been the stated aim 
of some key Palestinian groups and many international players involved in negotiations. 
Another political outcome could be that the West Bank and Gaza each become sovereign 
states. While not the officially declared aim of any political group at present, with Gaza 
and the Palestinian controlled parts of the West Bank currently under the rule of different 
Palestinian factions, such an outcome could conceivably eventuate. 
 
Further political outcomes include the formation of a bi-national state, either an Israeli-
Palestinian bi-national state, or a Palestinian-Jordanian bi-national state. A Palestinian-
Jordanian bi-national state would nearly be a return to the situation which existed prior to 
1967 when Jordan ruled the West Bank except that it might also include the Gaza Strip 
and thus provide the new state with a Mediterranean sea port. An Israeli-Palestinian bi-
national state could occur as a result of political agreement that resulted in full civil and 
political rights for both national groups living in Israel and Palestine. Alternatively, it 
could also occur on a de facto basis as a continuation of Israel’s military occupation of 
Palestine, with one national group dominating another and the vision of a two-state 
solution dropped for no longer being practical. 
 
The major factors that will determine the populations of the region in 2050 are thus the 
speed by which fertility rates fall, the movement of Palestinian refugees, and immigration 
rates. In identifying population scenarios for 2050, it is useful to determine the likely 
upper and lower bounds together with the medium population scenario that can be 
considered most probable if population growth expectations are achieved and there are no 
other major events impacting on the demography of the region. 
 
Table 5 outlines three broad population scenarios for Israel, Palestine and Jordan, and for 
the other possible territorial configurations. Scenario A is based upon the low population 
variant of the United Nations Population Division but assumes extensive emigration from 
the region, so the equivalent of the 20 percent of the final population of each nation has 
emigrated by 2050 and that there will be no unexpected immigration to the region, either 
Jewish or Palestinian. Scenario B is based on the medium population variant of the UN 
and assumes that there will be no unexpected migration of people either into or out of the 
region.  Scenario C is based on the high variant of the UN but also assumes that that 
entire Palestinian refugee populations of Syria and Lebanon relocate to Palestine, or to a 
bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state or a bi-national Palestinian-Jordanian state, and that 
the growth rate of this refugee population matches that of the Palestinian population in 
Palestine.  While it is extremely unlikely that the entire Palestinian refugee populations of 
Syria and Lebanon would move to Palestine if given the opportunity to do so, non-
returnees from these countries might be balanced by Palestinians from elsewhere in the 
world taking the opportunity to relocate to Palestine. For all scenarios, the individual 
populations given for the West Bank and Gaza Strip in Table 5 assume that the current 
ratio of population in these two territories remains unchanged.  
 
Table 5 clearly shows that under all scenarios with the exception of scenario A for Israel 
and Jordan, population densities will be considerably higher than those of today. In the 
case of scenario C, the population density of Palestine reaches in excess of 2,300 people 
per square kilometre, thus raising the question of whether this is even physically 
achievable. However, the evidence suggests that it is fully achievable even if it is not 
desirable. At present the population density of the Gaza Strip as a whole is nearly 4,200 
people per square kilometre, while of Gaza City itself, the population density is 
approximately 16,450 (Demographia 2008).  
 
By way of comparison, the projected population density for Palestine under scenario C is 
approximately twice that of Malta today. Sixteen cities in the world have population 
densities exceeding 20,000 people per square kilometre, with some such as Hong Kong 
reaching nearly 30,000 per square kilometre. If the entire population of Palestine under 
scenario 3 were housed at the current population density of Gaza City, then less than 15 
percent of Palestine would need to be urbanised. While it is hardly desirable to emulate 
the overcrowded and poor living conditions that exist in much of Gaza, it is clear that 
extremely high population densities can be (and are) sustained, and as Hong Kong 
demonstrates, the level of economic development is far more critical than the population 
density in determining quality of life.  
 
If the Gaza Strip were to become a politically independent nation while maintaining its 
current proportion of the Palestinian population, under scenario C it would have a 
population of 5.5 million and a population density of around 15,000 per square kilometre. 
Thus, the population density of Gaza as a whole would approximately match the current 
population density of Gaza City, with the urban area presumably expanding from is 
current 10 to 15 percent to fill most of the territory. 
 
 
Are the water resources of Israel, Palestine and Jordan sufficient until 2050? 
 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 outline the water resources per capita for each of the water and 
population scenario.  
 
For population scenario A, the per capita water resources for Israel, Jordan and both bi-
national state configurations remain above the minimum water requirement of 135 l/c/d 
required for social and economic development. However, in most cases water resources 
per capita are somewhat or considerably reduced compared to current levels. For 
Palestine, however, even this low population growth scenario is problematic under water 
scenario 1 – the continuation of current water resource division – as water resources per 
capita remain below the minimum water requirement. With the reallocation of water 
resources envisaged in scenarios 2 and 3 – with or without climate change – water 
resources remain adequate, either for Palestine as a whole, or for the West Bank 
individually. Water resources for the Gaza Strip individually are inadequate under all 
three water resource scenarios, suggesting that large scale desalination or water imports 
from Israel, the West Bank or elsewhere will be required under these scenarios and all 
other scenarios that consider the Gaza Strip independently to the West Bank. 
 Under population scenario B, water resources per capita also remain adequate for all 
water scenarios for Israel, Jordan and both bi-national state configurations. For Palestine, 
water resources per capita remain above the minimum water requirement only under 
water scenario 2. If the West Bank is considered separately to the Gaza Strip, water 
resources under water scenarios 2 and 3 remain adequate for the West Bank, again 
suggesting that a greater share of water is required if minimum water requirements are to 
be met in the long-term. With population scenario B, under all water resource scenarios 
Gaza would again be dependent upon desalination or water imports. 
 
Population scenario C is clearly the most problematic from a water resources perspective. 
Under all three water scenarios Israel and Jordan remain above the minimum water 
requirement, although only barely in the case of the climate change envisaged with water 
scenario 3. Both bi-national states fall below minimum water requirements under water 
scenario 3, while the Jordanian-Palestinian bi-national state also falls below minimum 
water requirements under water scenario 1. Palestine falls below the minimum water 
requirements level for all three water scenarios, and even the West Bank on its own is 
only slightly above the threshold under water scenarios 2 and 3. Gaza again requires large 
scale desalination or water imports.  
 
 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
The scenario analysis considered a range of possible outcomes in terms of the distribution 
of water resources of Israel, Jordan and Palestine, the effects of a major reduction in 
water resources availability due to climate change, and varying amounts of population 
growth and migration. Based on plausible assumptions, this scenario analysis suggests 
that at the very minimum the population of the region will increase by more than 20 
percent but could increase by as much as 220 percent, while water resources could 
decrease by as much as a third from the present. In most scenario outcomes, therefore, it 
is obvious that the region faces significantly less per capita water availability compared 
to the present. While this will present major challenges for water resource managers, the 
analysis suggests that the changes will be manageable. 
 
In the case of Israel, its per capita water resources will remain above the minimum water 
requirement under all scenarios. This would suggest that Israel has some flexibility in any 
future negotiations with the Palestinians with regards to the use of shared water 
resources. In Jordan per capita water resources will also remain above the minimum 
water requirement under all scenarios. Thus, both Jordan and Israel will not be forced to 
make extensive use of desalination to meet their basic water needs in the foreseeable 
future although both will likely choose to develop their desalination capacity as a way of 
avoiding politically difficult transfers of water allocations from their agricultural sectors 
to their urban economies. They may also choose to develop their desalination capacity in 
order to provide security against climatic variability, particularly if their naturally 
available per capita water resources approach the minimum water requirement. 
 
In the case of Palestine as a whole, or if the West Bank and Gaza Strip are considered 
individually, per capita water resources are consistently inadequate without a greater 
allocation of the shared water resources and without such a reallocation of water 
resources or new water resources being developed, the situation is bleak. However, if a 
reallocation of occurs that is of a similar magnitude to that outlined in this paper, per 
capita water resources for the West Bank will be above the minimum water requirement 
for all population and climate change scenarios.   For the Gaza Strip though, it is clear 
that water imports or desalination are required under all scenarios. The Mediterranean 
coast and the low-lying nature of the Gaza Strip, together with the falling cost of 
desalination mean that this should be possible, particularly if outside financial and 
technical support can be found.  
 
Israel, Palestine and Jordan are likely for the foreseeable future to have sufficient 
naturally available water resources to permit social and economic development if water 
resources are equitably shared and are managed effectively and extremely efficiently. The 
only exception to this is the Gaza Strip where the basic water requirements need to be 
met through desalination or the importation of water from elsewhere. 
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Figure 1: The groundwater basins and Jordan River system of Israel, Palestine and 
Jordan. (U.S. Geological Survey 1998, p11) 
 
 
 
Table 1: Available renewable water according to source in Israel / Palestine  (Israeli 
Ministry of Environmental Protection 2005). 
Resource Renewable water 
(MCM/year) 
Coastal Aquifer 249 
Western Mountain Aquifer 360 
Eastern Mountain Aquifer 353 
Western Galilee Aquifer 153 
Lake Tiberias / Jordan River 659 
Other sources 79 
Total 1,853 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Available renewable water by source in Jordan, excluding the 50mcm of water 
provided by Israel to Jordan under the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty (Jordanian Ministry 
of Water and Irrigation and Cooperation 2004). 
Resource Renewable water (MCM / year) 
Jordan valley 15-20 
Jordan side valley 28-32 
Yarmouk 30-35 
Amman-Zarqa 60-70 
Azraq 30-45 
Hammad 12-16 
Dead Sea 40-50 
Wadi Araba North 5-7 
Wadi Araba South 4-6 
Jafr 7-10 
Sarhan 4-6 
Renewable 
groundwater 
Southern Desert 2-3 
259
Internal Jordanian 
surface waters 
(median annual 
flood flow and 
base flow) 
 
454Surface water 
Yarmouk River   167
Total   880
  
 
 
Table 3: The approximate current division of the water resources of Israel, Palestine and 
Jordan, excluding the degraded Coastal Aquifer of the Gaza Strip. Population data are 
from Central Intelligence Agency (2008). 
Current division: Volume & percentage share Water 
source 
Renewable 
volume 
(mcm) 
Israel Palestine Jordan 
Coastal 
aquifer 
249 249 (100%) 
 
ii - 
Mountain 
aquifer 
713 600  
(84%) 
113  
(16%) 
- 
Western 
Galilee 
Aquifer 
(and other 
internal 
Israeli 
sources) 
232 232 (100%) 
 
- - 
Internal 
Jordanian 
aquifers 
259 - - 259 (100%) 
Jordan 
River basin 
1280 659  
(51%) 
0% 621 (49%) 
Water sales 
/ transfers 
 -99 49  (45 to West Bank; 
5 to Gaza Strip) 
50 
Total 
renewable 
water 
resources 
2733 1641 (60%) 162 
(6%) 
930 
(34%) 
Current per 
capita 
water 
resources 
(l/c/d)  
435  632 113 (total) 
179 (WB) 
9 (Gaza)iii 
411 
 
 
                                                          
ii Current exploitation of the Gaza portion of the Coastal Aquifer is 172.5 mcm, however, most of this water 
fails WHO drinking water standards, and the continuing rapid deterioration of this resource suggest that it 
will not be able to be used as a freshwater resource in 2050. 
iii Including the semi-saline waters from the Gazan Coastal Aquifer, the current water resource per capita 
for Palestine as a whole is 235 l/c/d, and for Gaza is 323 l/c/d. 
Table 4: Natural renewable water resources for Israel, Palestine and Jordan under each of 
the Water Resource Scenarios in mcm. 
Water resource scenario Nation 
1 2 3 
Israel 1641 1117 745 
162 686 457 
157 686 457 
Palestine 
West Bank 
Gaza 5 0 0 
Jordan  930 930 620 
 
 
Table 5: Population projections and resulting population densities for the different 
scenarios. (Current situation data: CIA World Fact Book 2008) 
Scenario Geographic area Population 
(millions) 
Population density 
(persons /km2) 
Israel 7.1 350 
Palestine 3.9 628 Current situation Jordan 6.2 67 
Israel 7.2 354 
7.1 1,141 
4.4 751 
Palestine 
West Bank 
Gaza 2.7 7,500 
Jordan  6.8 74 
Bi-national 
Israeli-
Palestinian state 
14.3 539 Scenario A: 
Low 
Bi-national 
Jordanian-
Palestinian state 
13.9 142 
Israel 10.5 516 
10.3 1,656 
6.3 1,075 
Palestine 
West Bank 
Gaza 4.0 11,111 
Jordan  10.1 110 
Bi-national 
Israeli-
Palestinian state 
20.8 768 Scenario B: 
Medium 
Bi-national 
Jordanian-
Palestinian state 
20.4 
 
208 
Israel 12.2 600 
14.4 2,315 
8.9 1,519 
Palestine 
West Bank 
Gaza 5.5 15,278 
Jordan  11.9 129 
Bi-national 
Israeli-
Palestinian state 
26.6 1,002 Scenario C: 
High 
Bi-national 
Jordanian-
Palestinian state 
26.3 268 
 
 
Table 6: Water resources per capita under the different water resource scenarios for 
population scenario 1 (Low population growth and significant emigration). 
Water Resources per capita (l/c/d) Nation Population 
Water 
scenario1 
Water 
scenario2 
Water 
scenario3 
Israel 7.2 624 425 283 
Palestine 7.1 62 265 176 
West Bank 4.4 98 427 284 
Gaza 2.7 5 0 0 
Jordan  6.8 374 374 230 
Bi-national 
Israeli-
Palestinian 
state 
14.3 345 345 230 
Bi-national 
Jordanian-
Palestinian 
state 
13.9 215 318 212 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Water resources per capita under the different water resource scenarios for 
population scenario 2 (Medium population growth and no significant migration changes). 
Water Resources per capita (l/c/d) Nation Population 
Water 
scenario1 
Water 
scenario2 
Water 
scenario3 
Israel 10.5 428 291 194 
Palestine 10.3 43 182 121 
West Bank 6.3 68 298 199 
Gaza 4.0 3 0 0 
Jordan  10.1 252 252 168 
Bi-national 
Israeli-
Palestinian 
state 
20.8 237 237 158 
Bi-national 
Jordanian-
Palestinian 
state 
20.4 
 
147 217 145 
 
Table 8: Water resources per capita under the different water resource scenarios for 
population scenario 3 (High population growth and significant influx of Palestinian 
refugees). 
Water Resources per capita (l/c/d) Nation Population 
Water 
scenario1 
Water 
scenario2 
Water 
scenario3 
Israel 12.2 368 251 167 
Palestine 14.4 31 130 87 
West Bank 8.9 48 211 141 
Gaza 5.5 2 0 0 
Jordan  11.9 214 214 143 
Bi-national 
Israeli-
Palestinian 
state 
26.6 186 186 124 
Bi-national 
Jordanian-
Palestinian 
state 
26.3 114 168 112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
